The Ugandan government has significantly expanded access to public schools and clinics, even in rural and remote areas. This expansion has also been fairly equitable across regions, despite large regional inequalities in the country. But complaints abound that the government builds “hollow” facilities, providing few if any staff or supplies for facility operations. In an original survey, 89% of local councillors agreed that the government builds public facilities without making sure there are sufficient staff or supplies. Why do governments engage in the hollow expansion of public facilities, despite the financial and political costs of doing so? This research argues that hollow expansion, while costly for the country as a whole, is lucrative for a set of unscrupulous government officials and contractors. Illicit financial incentives lead officials to over-invest in facility construction and under-invest in operations. Meanwhile, leaders in the central government can pass the political fallout for hollow public services onto local representatives and service providers.
To test these arguments, this research adopts a mixed methods approach. These methods include interviews with Members of Parliament, local officials, service providers, and rural citizens; an original survey of local officials at facility construction sites, which addresses corruption in construction projects; and an original survey of rural citizens, which addresses the political costs for hollowness and contains two survey experiments.
This research is relevant to both international and Ugandan policymakers. The problem of hollow expansion suggests that donors and lenders may need to re-evaluate the extent to which their funds go toward public facility construction. International financial institutions should adopt more stringent procurement regulations, closely audit construction works, and monitor post-construction staffing levels. Ugandan legislators can also benefit from this research. This research provides evidence to legislators seeking to hold government officials accountable for corruption, and it informs legislators of citizens’ frustrations regarding service delivery and with whom they are frustrated. This data also upends existing academic theories about public goods provision, showing that rent-seeking often motivates the expansion of public goods into peripheral areas.
