The Theme 5 workshop focused on the political economy of policies that promote economic development. We are particularly interested in understanding the following questions: Why are growth-conductive policies or regulations adopted in some regions but not in others? What is the role of capture by interest groups and elites in determining these policy outcomes? What are the political economy implications of the increased collaboration between public and private sectors in several developing countries?
Programme
Friday 28 August
13:45 Welcoming remarks
14:00 The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats Adnan Khan (LSE) with Oriana Bandiera (CEPR & LSE) , Michael Best (CEPR & Columbia) and Andrea Prat (CEPR & Columbia) Recording
14:45 Political Uncertainty, Market Structure and The Forms of State Capture Nathan Canen (Houston) with Rafael Ch (NYU) and Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton) Recording
15:00 Break
16:00 Political Distortions and Structural Transformation Monica Martinez-Bravo (CEPR & CEMFI) and Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton) Recording
16:40 Panel Discussion with Daron Acemoglu (CEPR & MIT) and Rohini Pande (CEPR & Yale) chaired by Ernesto Dal Bó (UC Berkeley) Recording
Saturday 29 August
15:00 The Effects of Firms' Lobbying on Resource Misallocation Federico Huneeus (Yale) with In Song Kim (MIT) Recording
15:45 Data-intensive Innovation and the State: Evidence from AI Firms in China Noam Yuchtman (LSE) with Martin Beraja (MIT) and David Yang (Harvard) Recording
16:30 Break
17:00 Civil Service Reform and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from the Pendleton Act Diana Moreira (UC Davis) with Santiago Perez (UC Davis) Recording
17:50 Information Technology and Government Decentralization: Experimental Evidence from Paraguay Ernesto Dal Bó (UC Berkeley) with Federico Finan (UC Berkeley), Nicholas Y. Li (Toronto) and Laura Schechter (UW Madison) Recording
