Working Paper

Regulation by Reputation? Intermediaries, Labor Abuses, and International Migration

WP FernandoSingh RegulationByReputation.pdf

PDF DOCUMENT • 7.08 MB

RegulationByReputation.jpeg

Migrants workers and employers rely on intermediaries to facilitate labor market placements. If information frictions obscure their reputation, however, intermediaries may under-invest in placement quality. Using data on over 1.5 million Sri Lankan migrants to the Gulf region, we examine the effects of an intermediary rating program that publicly revealed ratings two years after it was announced. Prior to the ratings being revealed, eligible under-performing agencies invest in the rating criteria and place migrants with less abusive employers who pay higher salaries. Our results suggest that the threat of quality revelation induced agencies to prospectively screen employers.

Related content

STEG Working Paper Series

Worker Mobility in Production Networks

Marvin Cardoza, Francesco Grigoli, Nicola Pierri, Cian Ruane • Research Theme 1: Firms, Frictions and Spillovers, and Industrial Policy
STEG Working Paper Series

The Great Upgrade

Alexandros Ragoussis, Jonathan Timmis • Research Theme 1: Firms, Frictions and Spillovers, and Industrial Policy
STEG Working Paper Series

Occupational Inheritance in Africa

Nicolas Syrichas • Research Theme 2: Labour, Home Production, and Structural Transformation at the Level of the Household
STEG Working Paper Series

Spatial Production Networks

Costas Arkolakis, Federico Huneeus, Yuhei Miyauchi • Research Theme 1: Firms, Frictions and Spillovers, and Industrial Policy
STEG Working Paper Series

Bureaucratic Nepotism

Juan Felipe Riaño • Research Theme 5: Political Economy and Public Investment